The SEC enacted Rule 10b5-1 to deter insiders from trading with private information, yet also protect insiders' preplanned, non-information-based trades from litigation. Despite its requirement that insiders plan trade when not privately informed, the Rule appears to enable information-based trade. Participating insiders earn abnormal profits larger than profits in periods before the Rule, and larger than profits to insiders trading outside of the Rule. Participating insiders also appear to trade more when it is profitable. Specifically, participating insiders' sales volume is positively associated with abnormal returns and is greater before "bad news" earnings announcements than before "good news" earnings announcements.
Introduction
This study examines whether insiders earn information-based profits from trades protected from legal liability within the SEC Rule 10b5-1 safe harbor. The Rule protects insiders' trades from civil or criminal penalties if they are planned in advance when insiders do not possess material nonpublic information. Certain Rule provisions, however, may allow insiders to profit from information-based trade while still obtaining legal protection within the safe harbor. The potential for insiders to protect profitable trade makes the Rule interesting since it seems to conflict with regulatory intent and since there appears to be broad use of the Rule in the market.
An analysis of Rule 10b5-1 trade profits provides an understanding of how insiders respond to a regulation that both increases insiders' trade risk by implementing a stricter enforcement standard, and decreases insiders' trade risk by implementing a safe harbor to protect certain trades. The ambiguous effect of the regulation on insiders' trade risk makes this analysis different from prior research that shows that regulation limits insiders' profitable trade opportunities. Prior research shows that insiders appear reluctant to trade profitably before forthcoming news events (Givoly and Palmon, 1985) ; earnings announcements (Park, Jang, and Loeb, 1995) , and management earnings forecasts (Penman, 1982; Noe, 1999) . Insiders also appear to reduce profitable trade before takeover announcements (Seyhun, 1992) and before negative earnings surprises (Garfinkel, 1997 ) in response to regulation or case law that increases penalties for illegal insider trading.
This study should interest regulators and market participants who would like to evaluate the effect of the Rule, since the Rule is intended to deter insiders from trading with material nonpublic information, yet protect trades by uninformed insiders from legal liability.
Regulators, for example, might be interested in whether insiders mimic Kenneth Lay, who relied on the Rule to protect up to $100 million in personal stock sales prior to Enron's demise. 1 This study should also help firms and insiders assess costs and benefits of establishing trade plans within the Rule's safe harbor.
Ex ante, it is not clear whether the Rule provides insiders the opportunity to profit from information-based trade. The safe harbor requires insiders to plan trade when they do not possess material nonpublic information, so insiders should not be able to systematically earn abnormal profits in an efficient market. Trades planned in advance are also subject to greater market risk, thereby reducing their profit potential. Yet, certain Rule provisions may protect insiders' information-based trade, allowing insiders to earn abnormal trade profits and perhaps encouraging them to trade when they might not have otherwise.
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Evidence suggests insiders who participate within Rule 10b5-1 trade plans profit from information-based trade. Participants' sales, on average, follow price increases and precede price declines generating economically large abnormal profits. Participants' trade profits are larger than trade profits in periods before the Rule was available and are larger than trade profits to other insiders, from the same firm, who choose not to participate within the Rule.
Participating insiders also appear to increase trade volume when it is most profitable.
There is a positive association between abnormal trade returns and participants' sales trade volume. Net sales are also concentrated around earnings announcements when they would be most profitable; e.g., greater sales volume before "bad news" announcements and lower sales volume after "bad news" announcements. This is consistent with the Rule relaxing insiders' trade risk since it appears insiders trade more in periods when they might not have otherwise.
Collectively, the results of this study suggest the Rule relaxes insiders' trade risk thereby allowing insiders to increase profitable trade activity. Results are consistent with a notion, presented in the business press, that insiders use the Rule for "immunity baths,"
where they sell shares before price declines yet maintain legal impunity. 3 Results are also consistent with the possibility that insiders modify information disclosure timing or quality to profit from trades planned within the Rule. In either case, there are clearly policy implications if the intent of the regulation is to make it difficult for insiders to profit from information-based trade.
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides background information about SEC Rule 10b5-1. Section 3 presents the hypotheses. Section 4 presents the sample. Section 5 presents results. And Section 6 concludes the paper and discusses future research ideas.
Rule 10b5-1
The SEC released Rule 10b5-1 in October 2000, in part to deter insiders from trading while in possession of material nonpublic information. The SEC implemented relief within the Rule because it recognized that the possession standard limits insiders' ability to trade for diversification since insiders routinely possess material nonpublic information. The Rule provides an affirmative defense against litigation to insiders who preplan trades when they do not possess material nonpublic information.
This safe harbor does not prevent a party from initiating a lawsuit against insiders, but it does provide insiders a defense "which, if found to be credible, will negate criminal or civil liability, even if it is proven that the defendant committed the alleged acts." 7, 8 To qualify for the affirmative defense, insiders must: (1) enter into an irrevocable and explicit contract to purchase or sell firm securities; (2) transfer trade execution authority to 5 Usually, this argument requires the insider to demonstrate some tangible need for the proceeds from the equity transaction (e.g., a house purchase). and also considered mandating disclosure of 10b5-1 participation within Form 4 for trades that are executed pursuant to these plans. 13 This proposal, however, has been tabled indefinitely. 14 Some firms, however, choose to voluntarily disclose participation in 10b5-1 trading programs, which provides the opportunity to identify the sample used in this study. Finally, the Rule allows insiders to manipulate the timing and content of disclosures related to material information obtained subsequent to faithful plan initiation. This is because the Rule does not require an insider to abstain from trade if he obtains material 16 An example can illustrate this point. An insider sells shares the day before his firm releases news that triggers a large stock price decline. Without 10b5-1, courts evaluate whether he possessed material nonpublic information regarding the news release on the transaction date. There is high probability that courts will link the transaction with possession. However, if the transaction was planned six months earlier within the Rule, courts must now assess whether he possessed material nonpublic information regarding the news release at the plan initiation date. Because of the distance between events, it will be more difficult for courts to link the transaction with possession. 17 Firms' use of the Rule as a substitute for blackout windows was confirmed through discussion with several firms' corporate attorneys. 18 See Jeng (1999); Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon (2000); and Roulstone (2003) for discussion about firmimposed blackout windows. 19 Rule 101(c) of Regulation BTR, 17 CFR 245.101(c).
Hypotheses
nonpublic information after he has initiated his trading plan. Therefore, insiders with existing plans can disclose subsequently obtained material nonpublic information when it maximizes planned trade profits.
This leads to the following hypothesis (in alternative form).
H1: Rule 10b5-1 trades are based on private information.
3b. Trade volume and profitability
It is unclear whether one should observe higher trade volume by participating insiders when it is more profitable. If participating insiders are true liquidity traders, as the Rule likely intends, then their trades should be randomly distributed across time, absent any blackout restrictions. This is feasible within Rule 10b5-1 since many firms relax blackout windows for these trades. However, relaxation of blackout windows combined with the potential for lower informed trade litigation risk provides participants better opportunity to trade when it is more profitable, such as prior to news events like earnings announcements.
If participants trade more when it is more profitable, then one should observe higher net sales volume prior to disclosure of "bad" news than prior to disclosure of "good" news.
Similarly, one should observe higher net sales volume after disclosure of "good" news than after disclosure of "bad" news. Prior research that examines insider trade patterns before the existence of Rule 10b5-1 finds little evidence of strategic net sales patterns prior to news events because of both litigation concerns (e.g., Seyhun, 1992; Garfinkel, 1997; Noe, 1999 ) and firm-imposed blackout windows (e.g., Bettis, Coles, and Lemmon, 2000; Roulstone, 2003; Roulstone and Jagolinzer, 2004) . These restrictions and litigation concerns appear to limit insiders' trades to windows after news events. It is natural then, to expect more trade volume during otherwise risky yet more profitable periods if the Rule relaxes informed trade litigation risk. This leads to the following hypothesis (in alternative form):
H2: There is more Rule 10b5-1 trade volume during more profitable periods than during less profitable periods.
Sample
Rule 10b5-1 participants are identified using a keyword search for the term "10b5-1" It appears that most participants are top-level managers. Panel C of Table 1 shows a large concentration of managers from top positions within the participation group. There is, however, some lower-level management (i.e., managers who rank below the top-four executives) representation within this group, so the Rule does not appear to be exclusively available to top management.
Panel D of Table 1 shows that Rule 10b5-1 trades are predominantly sales. This is consistent with insiders using the Rule to protect sales since insiders' sales are subject to greater legal scrutiny than insiders' purchases.
Rule 10b5-1 trade volume represents a majority of total insider trade volume at disclosure firms. Panel D of Table 1 shows that, for both sales and purchases, participants'
transactions are most of all insider share transactions within these firms. Specifically, 76%
of all insider purchase and 74% of insider sales transactions, on average, are executed through 10b5-1 plans.
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There appears to be reasonably broad use of the Rule at firms that provide no disclosure. 
Empirical Results
Consistent with prior research, this study infers whether Rule 10b5-1 trades are information-based from insiders' abnormal trade returns (e.g., Finnerty, 1976) and insiders' trade patterns surrounding news events (e.g., Karpoff and Lee, 1991; Seyhun, 1992; Seyhun and Bradley, 1997; Noe, 1999) . Finnerty (1976) suggests that insiders' trades should not systematically generate abnormal returns in an efficient market if insiders are not privately 20 It is assumed that all transactions made by participants during the six-month window following disclosure are subject to 10b5-1 plans. It is possible that some transactions are executed outside of these plans. This is unlikely, however, since it is costly for participants to trade outside of their plans (see section 2). 21 The ability to generalize results beyond this study's sample is discussed in Section 6.
informed. Therefore evidence of abnormal returns is consistent with informed trade.
Patterns of profitable trade preceding events (e.g., sales before bankruptcy) are also consistent with informed trade and comprise the bulk of evidence supporting illegal trade activity in case law (Seyhun, 1992) .
5a. Abnormal Returns and Profits
To examine whether trades within the Rule are information-based, Panel A of Table 3 presents abnormal return and profit data for sales by insiders who trade within the Rule.
Data regarding insiders' purchases are not tabulated because the sample of insiders' purchases is too small for statistical inference. 22 Within the 180 sample firms, 290 insiders initiate sales during the six-month window following the firms' disclosure of 10b5-1 participation. For each trade by each insider, the abnormal return is computed as the sixmonth buy-and-hold return from the date of trade minus the six-month buy-and-hold return to the CRSP value weighted portfolio. 23 Because these are sales transactions, the buy-andhold abnormal return is multiplied by -1 since sales represent foregone profits or avoidance of loss. MeanRet is then computed as the insider's average abnormal return per trade during the six-month window following the firm's 10b5-1 disclosure. TotalProf, a measure of the economic value of trades made within the Rule, is computed as each insider's cumulative abnormal dollar profit for the period. In other words, TotalProf is computed by multiplying each trade's abnormal return by its dollar volume and then cumulating periodic trade profit to each insider. 22 There is little evidence of profitable trade within the sample of 17 insiders who had 10b5-1 purchase transactions. 23 Prior research generally computes abnormal returns over a six-month horizon, since insiders are penalized for profits earned on trades made fewer than 180 days subsequent to prior trades (i.e., "short-swing" rule).
Panel A of Table 3 shows that participating insiders earn statistically positive abnormal returns and economically significant abnormal profits from sales planned within Rule 10b5-1. On average, participants' sales anticipate firm price declines, providing a 6% marketadjusted average abnormal return. This translates, on average, to a periodic trade profit of almost $409,000 per insider for the six-month window. This evidence suggests insiders' trades within the Rule are information-based.
To examine whether participating insiders' trades follow price increases or declines, Panel A of Table 3 presents firm returns prior to trade activity. PriorRet is computed as the firm's buy-and-hold return for the twenty days preceding each participant's first trade execution during the period. On average, firms observe a 10% run-up in stock price preceding participants' sales activity. This suggests that participating insiders employ contrarian trade strategies, consistent with Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) .
Collectively, evidence in Panel A of Table 3 is consistent with participants utilizing information to profit from trades planned within the Rule. Participants appear to systematically execute sales between price increases and subsequent price declines, generating statistically positive and economically significant abnormal profits.
Participants' trade profits appear larger than those to nonparticipant traders from within the same firms. Panel B of Finally, participants' trade profits appear higher than profits earned before the Rule was available, despite the Rule's requirement to plan trade without possession of material information. Panel C of Table 3 shows an average 9% increase in MeanRet for the 79 participants from 54 firms who actively sell shares in both the six-month window following disclosure of their participation and a six-month window that begins one year before the disclosure date. Average improvement in TotalProf of nearly $300,000 is not statistically different from zero, however median improvement of nearly $76,000 is significant at the 1% level (one-tailed), providing some evidence that the Rule improves insiders' trade profits.
5a1. Sensitivity Analyses
Inferences from the analyses in Panel A of Table 3 are unaffected when abnormal returns are computed using the six-month buy-and-hold returns to the CRSP equally weighted portfolio, the S&P 500 index portfolio, and the CRSP value weighted Nasdaq portfolio. Specifically, the mean abnormal returns from sales plans are 22%, 4%, and 7%, respectively, generating mean total abnormal profits of $914,000, $346,000, and $276,000.
Results are also consistent when abnormal returns are computed over 1-, 3-, and 9-month buy-and-hold horizons. Similarly, results regarding returns before trade are consistent when PriorRet is computed using 30-, 60-, and 90-day windows.
Results in Panel B of 
SqrtDollVol is the square root of dollar sales volume; AbnRet is the six-month buy-and-hold return per trade executed by an insider during the window minus the six-month CRSP value weighted buy-and-hold return; Part is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the insider is a participant and zero otherwise; and j and l are indices for insider and trade, respectively.
Consistent with Noe (1999) , the square root of dollar volume is used to control for the effects of outliers in the sample. The distribution for dollar volume of sales is, not surprisingly, heavily right-skewed.
24 Consistent with expectations, participation is positively associated with a proxy for an insider's personal litigation risk, his prior trading frequency, his stock compensation, and his firm equity position. The proxy for an insider's personal litigation risk is computed in Appendix C. This proxy reflects the likelihood an insider will be named as a defendant in a 10b5 lawsuit as a function of his prior trade activity and position within the company.
In Table 4 , there is no detectable association between SqrtDollVol and AbnRet for nonparticipants (β 1 = −0.32; t-statistic = −0.63). In contrast, Table 4 documents a greater relative positive association for participants than nonparticipants between abnormal returns and dollar sales volume (β 2 = 1.35; t-statistic = 2.72) resulting in a net positive association for participants (β 1 + β 2 = 1.03; t-statistic = 4.30). This suggests that participants sell more volume when abnormal returns are higher.
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Evidence that participants' trades are larger when it is more profitable (i.e., when subsequent abnormal returns are greater) is supported by the next analysis, which examines insiders' trade volume in proximity to earnings releases. Specifically, Panel A of Table 5 presents results of the following estimation:
SqrtDollVol is the square root of net dollar sales volume by an insider during the specified twenty-day trade window. BefEarns is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the twenty trading day window immediately preceding the earnings announcement date (reported by CRSP), and zero during the twenty trading day window immediately following the earnings announcement date. NegAnn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm's cumulative three-day return, centered on the announcement date, is less than the CRSP value-weighted portfolio cumulative return for the same three days; zero otherwise. And i, j, and k are subscripts denoting announcement, insider, and window, respectively.
Panel A of Table 5 reports results for 168 participants from 106 firms who trade in proximity to 88 "good news" and 102 "bad news" quarterly announcements during the sixmonth period following 10b5-1 disclosure. This sample represents all observations from Panel A of Table 3 for which earnings announcement data are available. Each insider has two volume observations for every one of his firm's quarterly announcements: one for the before window and one for the after window. This yields a total of 598 insiderannouncement-window observations.
Evidence in Panel A of Table 5 is consistent with participants concentrating trade volume when it is more profitable. Specifically, the positive coefficient on BefEarns * NegAnn (δ 3 = 9.85; t-statistic = 3.13) suggests participants trade more volume immediately before "bad news" announcements than immediately before "good news" announcements.
Similarly, the negative coefficient on NegAnn (δ 2 = −9.36; t-statistic = −3.50) suggests participants avoid sales immediately following "bad news" announcements.
For comparison and to help control for firm-level factors that might influence volume around earnings announcements, Panel B of Table 5 Table 3 for which earnings announcement data were available. Each insider has two volume observations for every one of his firm's quarterly announcements:
one for the before window and one for the after window. This yields a total of 1472 insider-announcement-window observations for the following estimation: Table 5 supports that in Panel A. Specifically, the coefficient on γ 6 is 9.44 (t-statistic = 3.54), suggesting that participants increase net sales volume before "bad news" earnings releases relative to nonparticipants.
Collectively, evidence suggests participating insiders concentrate sales when trades are more profitable. This pattern is evident even immediately before "bad news" earnings announcements, which is a period when insiders are likely to have a distinct information advantage and trade is commonly restricted outside of the Rule.
5b1. Sensitivity Analyses
Inferences from results in Table 4 are unaffected when AbnRet is computed using the six-month CRSP equally weighted buy-and-hold return, the six-month CRSP value weighted Nasdaq buy-and-hold return or the six-month return to the S&P500 index as the relevant benchmark. Similarly, inferences from results in Panels A and B of Table 5 are unaffected when: (1) the 20-trading-day window immediately before and after earnings announcements is replaced with 10-, 15-, and 30-day windows; (2) the benchmark for
NegAnn is replaced with equally-weighted CRSP or size decile returns; and (3) SqrtDollVol is replaced with the total net dollar sales volume or the rank of total net dollar sales volume.
Conclusions and Future Research
Rule 10b5-1 is an interesting insider trading regulation because it combines a stricter enforcement standard with a safe harbor for preplanned trade. Thus, the Rule represents rare regulation with an ex-ante ambiguous impact on insiders' trade risk. Evidence suggests that, through some combination of (1) the safe harbor, (2) enforcement of the possession standard at the plan initiation date, (3) relaxation of trading "blackout" windows, and/or (4) the absolution of participants' duty to disclose subsequently obtained information before trades execute, the Rule lowers trade risk thereby providing profitable trade opportunities. This outcome clearly has policy implications if the SEC's intent for the Rule is to make it more difficult for insiders to profit from information-based trade.
Exactly how insiders generate trade profits within their 10b5-1 plans is an interesting question for future research. Abnormal profits documented in this study could result from insiders illicitly planning trade when they possess nonpublic information or from insiders altering the timing or content of disclosures once trades have already been planned. It would be interesting to document to what degree either of these activities is present.
It is not clear how well this study's evidence describes Rule 10b5-1 trade activity within nondisclosure firms. One should use caution when generalizing these results beyond the documented sample. Results in this paper, however, may understate the extent of 10b5-1 information-based trade by insiders at nondisclosure firms. There may be more information-based trade within the Rule at nondisclosure firms because there is less ability to monitor insiders' compliance. Participating insiders at nondisclosure firms, for example, may find it easier to terminate plans before poorly-timed trades execute since the market is not aware these plans exist.
There are still some interesting questions to address regarding the market effects of disclosing participation within Rule 10b5-1. The Rule presents one of the few instances where firms provide ex-ante information regarding pending insider trades. It might be useful to examine how the market responds to 10b5-1 announcements and to what degree these announcements impact insiders' trade profits. If these announcements reduce insiders' profits, it would be interesting to then examine why firms voluntarily disclose this information when there is no mandate from the SEC. (Conover, 1999) MeanRet is the mean abnormal return per trade executed by an insider during the window. For each trade executed, the abnormal return is computed as the six-month buy-and-hold return minus the six-month CRSP value weighted buy-and-hold return.
TotalProf is the cumulative abnormal profit (in thousand dollars) by an insider from trades executed during the window. For each trade, the abnormal profit is computed as the six-month buy-and-hold return minus the six-month CRSP value weighted buy-and-hold return times the dollar amount traded. PriorRet is the firm's raw return over the twenty trading days immediately preceding an insider's first trade during the window. 
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AbnRet is the abnormal return per trade executed by an insider during the window. The abnormal return is computed as the six-month buy-and-hold return minus the six-month CRSP value weighted buy-and-hold return. SqrtDollVol is the square root of dollar volume of trade. Part is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the insider is a participant and zero otherwise. j and l are indices for insider and trade, respectively. Table 5 . Net Sales in Proximity to Earnings Releases Summary of insiders' net sales activity in close proximity to quarterly earnings announcements.
Panel A. Participants within Rule 10b5-1
Sample represents 598 insider-announcement-window observations. The sample is constructed from 106 firms within the sample in Panel A of Table 3 for which quarterly earnings announcement dates and corresponding price data are available. For 168 participants representing these firms, trade volume is cumulated during the 20-trading day window immediately before and immediately after each of the 88 "good news" and 102 "bad news" observed quarterly announcements. The intercept represents the fixed effect coefficient for the first firm in the sample. Other firm fixed effects coefficients are not reported. Table 5 . Net Sales in Proximity to Earnings Releases (continued)
Panel B. Participants vs. nonparticipants within the same firm
Sample represents 1472 insider-announcement-window observations. The sample is constructed from 80 firms within the sample in Panel B of Table 3 for which quarterly earnings announcement dates and corresponding price data are available. For 113 participants and 298 non-participants representing these firms, trade volume is cumulated during the 20-trading day window immediately before and immediately after each of the 67 "good news" and 74 "bad news" observed quarterly announcements. With the exception of the intercept, which represents the first firm in the sample, firm fixed effects coefficients are not reported. 
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SqrtDollVol is the square root of net dollar sales volume (i.e., sales minus purchases) by an insider during the specified twenty-day trade window. Part is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the insider is a participant and zero otherwise.
BefEarns is a dichotomous variable that equals one during the twenty trading day window immediately preceding the earnings announcement date (reported by CRSP), and zero during the twenty trading day window immediately following the earnings announcement date.
NegAnn is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the firm's cumulative three-day return, centered on the announcement date, is less than the CRSP value-weighted portfolio cumulative return for the same three days; zero otherwise. i, j, and k are subscripts denoting announcement, insider, and window, respectively. 
Recitals
A. Executive has decided to enter into this written plan of disposition to sell 700,000 shares of AmeriCredit common stock, which shares are comprised of (i) 282,666 shares to be acquired by Executive upon the exercise of certain stock options granted to Executive by AmeriCredit on April 28, 1994 that expire on April 28, 2001 (the "April Options"), (ii) 400,000 shares to be acquired by Executive upon the exercise of certain stock options granted to Executive by AmeriCredit on July 16, 1991 that expire on July 16, 2001 (the "July Options" and, together with the April Options, the "Options"), and (iii) 17,334 shares owned by Executive (the "Owned Shares" and, together with the shares to be acquired by Executive upon exercise of the Options, the "Plan Shares").
B. Executive has engaged Paine Webber ("Broker") to effect sales of the Plan Shares in accordance with this Plan, and to exercise the Options to the extent necessary to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold.
C. Executive acknowledges that he is not subject to any legal, regulatory or contractual restriction or undertaking that would prevent Broker from conducting sales in accordance with this Plan and is entering into this Plan in good faith. Further, Executive acknowledges that he is subject to AmeriCredit's insider trading policy (XIV-316), as supplemented and amended from time to time (the "Policy").
Agreement
In consideration of the foregoing, the Executive agrees to enter into this Plan in accordance with the following terms and conditions:
1. Sales Plan; Exercise of Options.
(a) The Executive agrees and agrees to instruct the Broker to sell the Plan Shares and to exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares, as provided below:
(i) For the period commencing on January 15, 2001 and ending on and including January 31, 2001, Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $28.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan;
(ii) For the period commencing on February 1, 2001 and ending on and including February 28, 2001, Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $29.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan; (iii) For the period commencing on March 1, 2001 and ending on and including March 31, 2001, Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $30.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan; (iv) For the period commencing on April 1, 2001 and ending on and including April 30, 2001, Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $31.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan; and, provided, further, , Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $32.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan; (vi) For the period commencing on June 1, 2001 and ending on and including June 30, 2001, Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $33.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan (vii) For the period commencing on July 1, 2001 and ending on and including July 13, 2001, Broker will sell as many as possible of the Plan Shares, and exercise the Options to the extent necessary to acquire the Plan Shares to be sold, up to a maximum of 100,000 shares, at any per share price of $34.50, or higher; provided, however, that the Options shall only be exercised by Broker to the extent the shares acquired therefrom will be sold pursuant to this Plan; and, provided, further, to the extent that all or some portion of the July Options remain unexercised and the Plan Shares underlying such July Options remain unsold by Broker on July 1, 2001, then in such event the remaining, unexercised portion of the July Options shall be exercised in full and the Plan Shares underlying such July Options sold by Broker during the period from July 1, 2001 through July 13, 2001 at such times (within such period), in such amounts and at such per share price as will maximize the aggregate proceeds to Executive from such transactions (b) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the Plan Shares to be sold by Broker pursuant to Section 1(a) above shall be sold in the following order of priority: first, the shares acquired upon exercise of the April Options; second, the shares acquired upon exercise of the July Options; and third, the Owned Shares.
(c) All sales of Plan Shares and exercises of the Options to the extent necessary to acquire such Plan Shares will be placed through or effected by Broker. The timing (within each sales period specified above) and execution of all sales will be made at the sole discretion of Broker to maximize the value to the Executive, provided that in all cases the specified number of Plan Shares must be sold during each sales period specified above in section 1(a). The Executive will provide no other instruction or guidance to Broker with respect to any sales. Broker will be provided with a copy of this Plan. The Executive will obtain from Broker an acknowledgement of the receipt of this Plan and an agreement that Broker will cease sales (but not exercises of the Options, to the extent necessary to cause the Options to be exercised in full before the respective expirations thereof as provided above in section 1(a)) under this Plan at such time as Broker may become in possession of material nonpublic information regarding AmeriCredit (as that phrase is used in 17 C.F.R.(S)240.10b-5). The number of Plan Shares sold under this Plan will be appropriately adjusted from time to time to reflect any stock split, stock dividend, reorganization, reclassification, consolidation or similar event with respect to AmeriCredit common stock.
(d) Notwithstanding the sales provisions of this Plan, the Executive will cease all sales under this Plan (but not Option exercises, to the extent necessary to cause the Option to be exercised in full before the respective expirations thereof, as provided above in section 1(a)), and will instruct Broker to cease all sales, promptly upon notice from the Secretary of AmeriCredit that the independent directors of the AmeriCredit Board of Directors have determined that sales under this Plan must be suspended for the period determined by those directors. In this regard, the Executive acknowledges that it may be necessary or appropriate for AmeriCredit to instruct Executive to suspend sales under this Plan in connection with certain events, including without limitation public or private offerings of securities, mergers or acquisitions, tender offers or similar events.
(e) Broker will conduct all sales in accordance with the requirements of Rule 144 under the Securities Act of 1933, including, but not limited to, the completion and filing by Broker of appropriate Form 144s. Broker will be instructed by Executive to provide AmeriCredit any information requested by AmeriCredit in connection with AmeriCredit's efforts to determine compliance with the terms of this Plan by Executive and Broker. Executive will be responsible for all filings required under Section 16 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (i.e., Form 4 filings). It is the intent of the Executive that this Plan comply with the requirements of Rule 10b5-1 (c) under the Exchange Act and this Plan shall be interpreted to comply with the requirements of Rule 10b5-1 (c).
(f) Notwithstanding this Plan, Executive may sell or purchase shares of AmeriCredit common stock (other than Plan Shares) pursuant to the Policy and subject to the terms and conditions thereof, and such sales or purchases shall not be subject to this Plan.
3. Term. This Plan shall become effective on the date executed by the Executive and shall terminate on the earliest to occur of: (i) July 15, 2001, (ii) the date on which a total of 700,000 shares of AmeriCredit common stock have been sold in accordance with the terms of this Plan, and (iii) the death of the Executive; provided, however, that Executive may terminate this Plan at any time upon written notice delivered to Broker with a copy to the Secretary of AmeriCredit.
4. Covenants. The Executive acknowledges and agrees that he will not exert any influence over how, when or whether to effect sales of Plan Shares subsequent to the effective date of this Plan and during the time period the Plan remains in effect.
5. Filing of Plan. The Executive agrees to file a copy of this Plan with the Secretary of AmeriCredit. Executive further acknowledges and agrees that a copy of this Plan may be filed by AmeriCredit with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and disclosed in reports filed by AmeriCredit with the SEC. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, this Stock Selling Plan is executed and effective as of the date set forth below the Executive's signature below. Defendant is a dichotomous variable that equals one if the insider is specifically named as a defendant in the 10b5 complaint (zero otherwise). NetPurchs is the total purchases minus sales by the insider during the 12-month period preceding the end of the class action period outlined in the 10b5 complaint, scaled by average shares outstanding. CEODum, CBDum, DirDum, CFODum and PresDum are dichotomous variables that equal one if the insider held the position of CEO, Chairman of the Board, Director, CFO, or President, respectively (zero otherwise).
Holds is the insider's personal firm holdings scaled by total shares outstanding in the fiscal year ending prior to the beginning of the 12-month period for NetPurchs; and StockComp is the ratio of the value of stock compensation to total compensation paid to the insider in the fiscal year ending prior to the beginning of the 12-month period for NetPurchs. The numerator is computed as the value of stock grants (5% growth assumption as provided in the proxy statements) plus restricted stock grant value. The denominator is the numerator plus salary, bonus, and all other pay. j is an index for insider.
